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Abstract— IP source address spoofing exploits a fundamental 
weakness in the Internet Protocol. It is exploited in many types of 
network-based attacks such as session hijacking and Denial of 
Service (DoS). Ingress and egress filtering is aimed at preventing 
IP spoofing. Techniques such as History based filtering are being 
used during DoS attacks to filter out attack packets. Packet 
marking techniques are being used to trace IP packets to a point 
that is close as possible to their actual source. Present IP spoofing 
countermeasures are hindered by compatibility issues between 
IPv4 and IPv6, implementation issues and their effectiveness 
under different types of attacks. We propose a topology based 
packet marking method that builds on the flexibility of packet 
marking as an IP trace back method while overcoming most of 
the shortcomings of present packet marking techniques. 
Keywords-IP Spoofing; Topology Based Packet Marking 
(TBPM); Denial of Service Attack (DoS); Ingress Filtering; Egress 
Filtering; Packet Marking; IP Trace-back; ICMP 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has become the backbone of 
telecommunication networks and a vital tool for personal 
communication as well as businesses, government and the 
military. Higher bandwidths have spurred a growth in the use 
of multimedia. The need for security on the Internet has always 
been important. However malicious activity on the Internet is 
increasing [1]. Law and security enforcement on the internet 
has made slow progress for many reasons [2]. Cyber-stalking, 
propagation of malware, DoS attacks and gaining unauthorized 
access to computer systems are threats to Internet security. 
Most of these attacks are carried out in such a way that the 
identity of the attacker is not revealed or under the guise of a 
false identity. In the Internet where a person’s identity is 
represented by a set of digits in a computer or a network, 
spoofing one’s identity and location is simple. It is done 
primarily by ‘spoofing’ the Sender Address field in an Internet 
Protocol (IP) header of a datagram [3]. This field is meant to 
identify the creator of the IP datagram. The Internet Protocol 
does not offer any protection to the ‘Sender address’ field by 
design [4]. It is a clear example that the Internet Protocol has 
not been designed with the core security features needed to 
withstand the types and volume of attacks that threaten it today 
[5]. Therefore it is a relatively easy and convenient way for 
attackers to mask their true identity  
The widespread use of IP spoofing in network attacks is a 
good example of the fact that attackers can easily mask their 
identity while they engage in malicious activities such as 
Distributed DoS attacks. 
Some security vulnerabilities in computer systems are a 
result of inherent weaknesses in the design and implementation 
of end user systems such as hardware and software loopholes 
[6]. In this work, we focus on security issues in the network 
and specifically, the ease with which the IP Protocol can be 
abused through source address spoofing. 
We examine the weaknesses of present IP trace back 
methods. It is desirable for IP trace-back mechanisms to be 
compatible with both IPv4 and IPv6. They also have to be 
effective when the network is under attack. Packet marking is a 
versatile tool in meeting these objectives. Mark spoofing and 
the need for multiple marked packets for the source address to 
be reconstructed are some of the key weaknesses we aim to 
overcome. Our approach focuses on a packet marking strategy 
which embeds information about the route that the packet 
traverses though a network. We build on principals of existing 
packet marking technology and propose a new method: 
Topology Based Packet marking (TBPM) that reasonably 
addresses these shortcomings. We argue that TBPM would be 
more effective than source address marking; particularly during 
DoS attacks. 
In section II we present previous work on IP spoofing 
countermeasures. Section III introduces TBPM which is our 
main contribution and discusses its implementation methods as 
well as performance. Section IV is a brief outline of future 
work and we conclude in section V. 
II. PREVIOUS WORK ON IP SPOOFING COUNTERMEASURES 
Many different techniques have been proposed as 
countermeasures against source address spoofing in IP 
datagrams [7]. There are two main types of countermeasures 
against IP source address spoofing in use today. One strategy is 
to focus on eliminating spoofed packets at network gateways. 
Another is to trace spoofed datagrams from a recipient to their 
actual source. An alternative approach is to enforce 
authentication of users at connection time; for example through 
encryption. 
The IP spoofing problem has been exploited in many 
attacks ranging from session hijacking, gaining unauthorised 
access based on the weakness of source IP authentication [5] 
and DoS attacks on networks and network devises. A debate 
about the need for security at the network layer was opened up 
with the introduction of the IPSec protocols drafted by the 
IETF working group [8]. Those who argue for security at the 
network layer claim that the advantages of security at this level 
will outweigh the disadvantages. They claim that the network 
layer should provide an acceptable level of security to the 
communication regardless of the security provided by higher 
levels and the end-to-end applications. Their claims are backed 
by the fact that an increased number of applications that use 
real-time and multicast data employ the connectionless User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) at the transport layer which is 
inherently insecure and therefore necessitates the need for 
security at the network layer. 
Opponents for securing network services at the network 
layer argue that incorporating security in the IP layer will be a 
complex task. They argue that the use of encryption based 
authentication and data security will reduce the throughput of 
the network while also being a hindrance in high speed 
networks where the processing speeds will not be able to keep-
up with the inflow of data through a broadband network [8]. 
A. Filtering 
Packet filtering aims to hinder the movement of spoofed IP 
packets through network gateways. Packet filtering at network 
gateways falls into two main categories. One is egress filtering 
which disallows packets with external source IP addresses to 
leave the network [9]. This eliminates most spoofed IP packets 
from leaving a network. The other is ingress filtering which 
blocks packets containing internal source IP addresses from 
entering a network. This blocks most spoofed packets from 
entering a network [10]. If implemented globally, these two 
types of filtering can completely eliminate the threat of IP 
spoofing. 
There is another type of packet filtering [11] which is 
effective particularly in defusing DoS attacks. During a DoS 
attack, it uses access logs of a web service to filter out new IP 
addresses that haven’t been logged at the site before. It relies 
on statistical data which indicates that approximately 86% of 
DoS traffic comes from IP addresses that have never been 
logged on a site before. 
B. IP trace-back 
Tracing back spoofed data packets to their original source 
is an alternative measure against IP spoofing. IP trace back 
techniques play a key role in defusing DoS attacks. They 
enable the trace back and blocking of attack packets as close to 
their sources as practically possible. IP trace back methods are 
widely used and researched [7, 12-15]. These techniques aim to 
trace-back IP packets to their actual source in spite of the 
spoofed source address in the packet header. Some trace-back 
techniques use the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
[16].  
1) Packet marking 
Packet marking is an alternative trace-back technique 
which is more flexible and versatile and therefore more widely 
used. Packet marking techniques in turn have many variations. 
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) and Probabilistic Packet 
Marking (PPM) are two primary methods with variations of 
their own. 
In conventional packet marking techniques, edge routers 
mark the source address of a packet in the redundant 16bit 
identification field in the IPv4 header. An IPv4 address is 32 
bits long and thus in conventional packet marking; it takes 
more than two packets to store an IP address length of 32 bits. 
A fraction of the source address will be marked on the 
redundant ‘ID field’ in the IPv4 header of packets passing 
through an edge router. The ID field of one packet may contain 
either the first or second half of the source address. A flag in 
the ‘flags’ field in the IP header will indicate whether the mark 
in the ID field is the first or second half of the actual source IP 
address.  
The destination will use the information in multiple packets 
to reconstruct the source address of a packet stream. A key 
drawback here is that at least two packets are needed to 
construct the actual source address. However, when the attack 
is carried out by multiple sources, more space in the IP header 
becomes necessary to indicate the identity of the particular 
source. This can make packet marking almost in-effective 
during Distributed DoS attacks.  
In DPM, each packet that passes through an edge router is 
‘marked’ [13]. In PPM, the marking is done randomly [14]. 
Both these techniques have been implemented with different 
enhancements and variations [7]. 
While the redundant 16-bit ‘Packet ID’ field in the IPv4 
header is utilised for packet marking there aren’t any 
significantly large redundant fields in IPv6. As a result present 
packet marking techniques are not compatible with IPv6. 
In traditional packet marking techniques, the edge routers 
are responsible for marking the packets with their source 
address. While packets marked by an edge router of a host 
network will indicate the address of its immediate neighbour 
outside the network, that node is unlikely to be the original 
source of the IP packet. The only way to know the actual 
source would be if the marking is done at the edge router of the 
source network. However the source network may not be 
trustworthy and the marking itself could be spoofed. 
Furthermore, a mark made by an external router could easily be 
overwritten by an edge router in another network. Such 
‘spoofed’ marks may invalidate the trace back effort. If the 
network uses DPM, all previous marks will be overwritten. 
Even though it is an effective countermeasure against ‘mark 
spoofing’, it also nullifies any valid marking done by 
neighbouring networks. 
It is clear therefore, that packet marking techniques that 
employ the redundant ID field in IPv4 packets are not as 
effective or efficient as egress and ingress filtering. Their 
advantage however lies in the fact that it can still be useful in 
the battle against DoS attacks as it provides information 
regarding the location where the packets enter a network. This 
enables the host to take action to stop the flow of packets 
towards the victim through a particular edge router. 
C. Authentication 
Authenticating users at connection time is an effective 
preventive measure against IP source address spoofing. 
However the IPv4 specification does not have any in-built 
provision for authentication. Even though authentication is a 
facility provided for in IPv6, it is not a mandatory 
implementation. The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a 
connectionless transport layer protocol that is used for real-
time and multicast applications in the TCP/IP protocol suite 
[17]. Most applications that use UDP cannot enforce end-to-
end connectivity and is therefore unable to enforce user 
authentication. For this reason, perpetrators of DoS attacks 
increasingly use UDP packets to carry out their attacks [11]. It 
is clear therefore that authentication at connection time is not a 
practical solution that can be applied under all circumstances. 
Authentication techniques cannot effectively identify 
legitimate traffic during a network-based DoS attack because a 
DoS attack can be initiated by an authenticated user. The 
additional bandwidth and processing overhead involved with 
cryptographic techniques can compound a DoS attack. 
Authentication cannot be used in one way communication such 
as email. Therefore it is clear that host authentication does not 
provide a comprehensive countermeasure against IP spoofing. 
D. Other IP spoofing countermeasures 
If the attack is unsophisticated, there might be a specific 
signature to the traffic [18]. A careful examination of captured 
packets may reveal a trait on which some rules can be based in 
router access control lists or firewalls in order to filter out 
attack traffic. Additionally, a large amount of traffic may 
originate from a specific origin point which could be 
temporarily blocked, allowing a portion of legitimate traffic 
through. This could block legitimate packets as well, but it is 
an unavoidable sacrifice. 
III. TOPOLOGY BASED PACKET MARKING (TBPM) 
Embedded topological information in a data packet has 
many advantages over traditional packet marking methods. 
Traditional packet marking methods only mark the identity of 
the edge router through which a packet enters a network. In a 
DoS scenario for example, as a result of the overwhelming 
inflow of traffic, the edge router may be unreachable to the 
node under attack. Having information about the route that the 
packet had traversed through the network will enable the node 
to defuse the attack as close to its source as practically possible 
even when the edge router is unreachable. That would also 
enable internal network functions to be restored when edge-
routers are under a DoS attack. 
It may not be desirable however, to reveal the topology of a 
network to outside sources. Embedding topological 
information in a readable form, within data packets that leave 
the network may expose sensitive internal topological 
information to outsiders. Embedding topological information in 
each data packet would also increase overheads in the network 
in terms of bandwidth as well as processing. Therefore the 
challenge in topology based packet marking is two-fold. The 
first objective is to conceal the topology of one network from 
another. The second is to minimise overheads. We propose 
steps that will help achieve both these objectives including the 
use of unique node IDs in networks. 
A. TBPM Method 
We propose to embed information in a data packet that 
would trace the route it takes from an edge router to its 
destination node. This would be done by each node appending 
a unique signature to the end of the datagram. The destination 
node will then be able to decode the route that the packet had 
taken through the network by reading the appended signatures 
sequentially. 
Appending node signatures to packets is not expected to 
require any modifications to the structure of the IP header. 
However, it is desirable to keep network and processing 
overheads to a minimum required level. A single network is 
almost never large enough to utilise the entire IP address space. 
A network of 50 nodes for example, needs only 6-bits to assign 
a unique ID to each node (and have 14 IDs left over). 
Appending multiple lengthy IP addresses to datagrams is an 
avoidable overhead. Therefore the IP address of a node can be 
replaced by an ID that is significantly smaller than its IP 
address. Listed below are the fundamental principals of TBPM. 
1. Assign unique network IDs for each node/router that 
packets pass through. The length of this ID (node signature) 
will be pre-defined for a particular network depending on the 
network size. The length of a hop-count field will also be 
determined depending on the topology of the network. The 
optimal lengths for these fields could be derived according to 
Table (1); 
TABLE I.  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND OPTIMISATION 
 
2. It is expected that the bit-length of a node ID would 
be significantly smaller than the length of an IP address. 
Therefore appending multiple node IDs is not expected to 
significantly inflate the size of the datagram. Figure (1) depicts 
a typical datagram marked by an edge router. 
 
Figure 1.  Datagram marked by edge router 
3. The edge router will add its unique ID and a hop-
count field to the end of the IP datagram. Each router that the 
packet subsequently passes through will update the Total 
Length (TL) field in the IP header, append its ID to the IP 
datagram and increment the hop-count. The destination host 
will use those two values to decode the network path of the 
datagram and separate that information from the actual data. 
Figure (2) illustrates how a datagram changes as it passes 
through subsequent routers. 
Network size X nodes   
Node ID Field length 2n bits (n ≥ log2X > n-1) 
Maximum hops in the 
network 
Y   
Hop Count Field length 2m bits (m ≥ log2Y > m-1) 
 Figure 2.  Adding topological data to a packet at each ‘hop’ 
4. If the appending of node signatures increases the size 
of the datagram beyond either its Maximum Transport Unit, or 
64KB which is the maximum possible length of an IP 
datagram, then in an IPv4 network, the packet will be 
fragmented as illustrated in Figure (3). IPv6 does not allow 
routers to fragment datagrams and this can potentially lead to 
complications when implementing TBPM in IPv6 networks. 
The simplest way of overcoming this is to set the Maximum 
Transmission Unit (MTU) [19] at the edge router to a value 
that accommodates sufficient space for TBPM.  
 
Figure 3.  Fragmentation of a datagram in an IPv4 network 
Given that each node in the network is aware of the Node 
ID length and the length of the Hop Count Field, TBPM is 
therefore compatible with both IPv4 and IPv6 networks. 
B. TBPM Performance factors 
There are many variable factors that govern how the 
processing and bandwidth overheads incurred by TBPM may 
affect performance in a particular network. 
TABLE II.  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Number of hops  H 
Network ID length  L 
Hop count length  C 
Number of instructions to 
increment Hop Count 
 H 
Number of instructions to 
append new ID 
 A 
Number of instructions to 
update Total Length (TL) 
field in IP header 
 T 
 
1) Network overheads 
Number of additional bits transmitted per datagram; 
At node 1: 
 L+C (1) 
At node 2: 
 L+L+C (2) 
At Node H: 
 LH+C (3) 
Total number of additional bits transmitted in the network 
from edge to destination – per datagram (N); 
 N = ½ HL (H+1) + HC (4) 
 N = H (1/2 L (H+1) + C) (5) 
Given that the average speed of a link in the network is ‘S’ 
bits per second (bps) and assuming that data traffic is 
uniformly distributed in the network, the average additional 
propagation delay per packet is: 
 N/S (seconds) (6) 
 H (1/2 L (H+1) + C) / S (seconds) (7) 
2) Processing overheads 
Total processing overhead per datagram: 
 H (h + a + t) instructions (8) 
Given that the average processing speed of a node in the 
network is P (instructions per second) and that data traffic is 
uniformly distributed in the network, the average processing 
delay caused by a datagram is: 
 H (h + a + t) / P (seconds) (9) 
C. TBPM performance enhancements 
One of the clear advantages of TBPM over traditional 
packet marking methods is that only one packet is necessary to 
reconstruct the entire path it has taken through the network 
including the source of its entry. Therefore it is sufficient that 
packets are marked randomly at a given frequency. This is 
expected to dramatically reduce the overheads associated with 
marking each and every packet that passes through a router and 
make TBPM comparably more efficient than present PPM 
methods and more economical than DPM methods without 
compromising its effectiveness as a IP source identification 
technique. 
Depending on the degree of threat and its severity, the 
frequency with which packets are marked could be changed at 
the edge routers. A new flag has to be set in the IP header for 
the edge router to indicate whether a given packet has been 
marked or not. 
D. Evaluation of TBPM 
It is clear that appending topological information incurs 
network as well as processing overheads at each node. 
Traditional packet marking methods only incur processing 
overheads which are relatively inexpensive compared with 
network overheads, in terms of cost and delays. 
In both IPv4 and IPv6, the total length of the datagram is 
recorded in the 16 bit Total Length (TL) field. As a result, the 
total length of an IP datagram has an upper limit of 64 kB. If 
node signatures are added beyond the 64kB limit, the IP 
datagram may have to be fragmented – adding to the 
processing and network overheads. 
The fact that it takes only one packet to reconstruct an 
entire path makes it viable for TBPM to be implemented as a 
probabilistic marking method even under Distributed DoS 
where traditional probabilistic packet marking methods fail to 
be effective [7]. 
The key strength of TBPM lies in its effectiveness as a 
tamper-proof method of tracing an IP datagram to its source 
along the path it has traversed through the network. TBPM also 
allows not only the source to be identified but also the 
intermediate nodes between the source and destination. This 
significantly increases the chances of the destination node to 
defend against DoS traffic – especially in a situation where the 
edge router is unreachable. 
IV. FUTURE WORK 
Our future work will focus on the design and modification 
of software and protocols that facilitate TBPM. An automated 
protocol for allocating Node IDs dynamically will allow more 
flexibility to network administrators. We also plan to measure 
performance gains that can be achieved by implementing 
TBPM probabilistically and comparing it with present packet 
marking methods for efficiency and effectiveness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There have been many approaches taken to hinder IP 
spoofing or alternatively to overcome the challenge of 
discovering the actual source of spoofed datagrams. We have 
reviewed the main IP spoofing countermeasures and pointed 
out their strengths and weaknesses. Our contribution in this 
paper has been a new approach in anti-IP spoofing techniques 
that we call Topology Based Packet Marking (TBPM). 
TBPM builds on the strengths of the packet marking 
principal; however it focuses not merely on the source, but also 
the path traversed by a datagram. We have pointed out how a 
route discovery method can be more effective, especially 
during DoS attacks where edge routers that mark packets may 
themselves be unavailable as a result of the attack. Embedded 
topological information may enable DoS attacks to be 
prevented even by intermediate routers. TBPM also enables the 
source to be identified using a single marked packet; unlike 
previous techniques that require multiple packets. We have 
shown how TBPM techniques are compatible with both IPv4 
and IPv6; unlike present packet marking techniques that cannot 
be effectively implemented in IPv6 networks. 
TBPM will give new direction to solving the IP trace back 
problem and provide more options and flexibility; especially in 
defending networks from DoS attacks. 
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